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May you live in interesting times. Ancient Chinese curse 
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the bipolar lenses through 
which many viewed the world of political violence and terrorism are gone. No longer can the complexity of 
this world be reduced to an international terror network of Soviet handlers, agents and proxies working in 
concert to destabilize the Western world. The definitional and typological complexities that were so 
cavalierly papered over during the 1970s and 1980s have begun to resurface in the discourse of those 
concerned with counter-terrorism. Cold warriors who forced a counterinsurgency model onto all things 
political and violent are now casting about to discern a new world disorder, a new agent of pernicious anti-
Western threats. While the current favorite seems to be Islamic fundamentalism, as evidenced by the obscene 
haste with which commentators attributed the Oklahoma City bombing to Islamic extremists, other 
candidates include Columbian drug lords and a kind of multinational corporate mafia.1 Indeed, the post-Cold 
War era is marked by a dizzying array of conflicts throughout the world and a panoply of actors willing to 
resort to violence in the name of a wide variety of causes. This is the context in which the US Director of 
Central Intelligence remarked in 1994 that the jungle is filled no longer with dragons, but with snakes. Yet, 
as one astute observer retorted, "I thought dragons were mythical beasts: snakes are dangerously real."2 In 
other words, the dragons of the Cold War, at least in the context of terrorism and political violence, were 
more imaginary than real. 
There is, nevertheless, a close connection between what we believe and what we perceive. While 
seeing is believing — our beliefs are based upon our perceptions — the opposite is also true. Believing is 
seeing in that we perceive what we believe to be there. If we believe that dragons exist, we will see them 
everywhere, even at the expense of seeing the snakes. If the communist threat is pervasive, it permeates all 
aspects of threat assessment, including assessment of the terrorist threat. Terrorist groups are sponsored or 
directed by communist states, even though they claim to be fighting for their own particular causes. All 
revolutionaries are communist puppets and are treated accordingly. Mujahadeen fighters are funded and 
armed so that they attack the Soviets in Afghanistan, despite their fundamentalist ideology and anti-
democratic goals. Indigenous protest movements, land-reforming governments, local conflicts are all cast in 
the light of East-West tension and global Cold War strategy. 
As with most self-fulfilling prophecies, there are very real consequences stemming from such 
definitions of reality. For example, revolutionary governments that are refused aid because they are 
perceived as Soviet puppet regimes become dependent upon Soviet aid. Anti-communist dictatorships that 
receive military aid sweep up a wide range of "communist sympathizers" in their nets of repression as they 
stretch the definition of "subversive" and "terrorist" to include all kinds of critics and reformers, fuelling 
public resentment and maintaining a pool of recruits for communist insurgents. Clearly, W.I. Thomas' dictum 
that if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences, is as pertinent today as it was when 
he made it, more than fifty years ago: because the mythical dragons were indeed perceived as real, and 
governments acted accordingly, those mythical beasts had very real consequences. 
Now that the Cold War glasses have been removed, what does the world of terrorism and political 
violence look like? Has there been a paradigm shift or has an old paradigm simply ceased blinding us to 
what has been going on for some time? What new threats exist and what old threats persist? What new 
solutions are needed and what old solutions continue to be relevant? The two books reviewed here take 
quite different approaches to the current wave of stocktaking that has emerged in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Richard Clutterbuck takes stock by surveying the jungle for "snakes," cataloguing them, 
and proposing primarily technological solutions for them. In doing so, he ranges far and wide and deals with 
an eclectic range of issues from drugs and weaponry to the more traditional counter-terrorist concerns of 
urban terrorism, guerrilla warfare and aviation security. Focusing explicitly on the end of the Cold War and 
the nature of conflict in the "post-communist world," his main concern seems to be the future and what to do 
about it. 
Christopher Hewitt, on the other hand, looks more at the past, confining himself to more traditional 
terrain, i.e. political violence, which he defines as "rioting, terrorism and civil war." (p. 1) In particular, he 
looks at five countries that have been plagued with serious campaigns of political violence: Northern Ireland 
(1968-86). Spain (1975-86), West Germany (1967-81), Italy (1968-81) and Uruguay (1962-73). His cases 
represent two geographic regions, Western Europe and Latin America, where ethnic-nationalist and 
revolutionary-left violence were concentrated. His scope is narrower and more focused: the consequences 
of political violence in Western democracies. By means of comparative and longitudinal analysis of five 
cases where sufficient public opinion surveys and statistical data on economic, social and political 
indicators were available. Hewitt tests specific hypotheses concerning the range of consequences that 
terrorism and political violence can have for democratic society. By confining his analysis to five national 
case studies, he is clearly highlighting domestic political violence at the expense of international terrorism, 
which was the favorite subject of study for many scholars who wore the Cold War glasses of the 70s and 
80s. This international focus was reflected in data bases as well, which typically did not show the high level 
of violence in Northern Ireland or Uruguay, for example, simply because purely domestic incidents were not 
recorded. 
Published one year earlier than Clutterbuck's volume, Hewitt's volume makes no explicit reference to 
the post-Cold War era. Instead, Hewitt seems concerned to evaluate in as systematic a fashion as possible the 
short-term and long-term impact of terrorism and political violence on democratic societies. Such a look 
backwards, while not directly addressing the concerns of Clutterbuck and others, is nevertheless very timely. 
Knowing exactly what the consequences of political violence were in specific cases in the recent past might 
help us better evaluate the potential impact of current campaigns of violence and terrorism in today's 
"cursed" world. As such, Hewitt's study can be used to inform, so to speak, Clutterbuck's survey of hot 
spots and trouble areas and his prescriptions for dealing with them. 
Both books have much to offer. Though a mere 144 pages, including a seven-page bibliography and a 
two-page index, Consequences of Political Violence is rich with interesting data and policy-relevant 
findings. Despite the author's own opinion that the limited scope of his research "makes it unlikely that the 
findings can be applied to non-Western societies." (p. 2) I think such applications can indeed be made, and 
Hewitt does at times refer to other nations, such as Turkey, Columbia, Venezuela, Argentina and Chile, when 
his data identify patterns that resonate elsewhere. After an introduction describing his approach and 
presenting the five cases and his methodology, Hewitt devotes separate chapters to the impact of political 
violence on the economy, the social order, the media and public opinion, party politics, and elections. In a 
concluding chapter, he looks at government and administrative policy and identifies three patterns of 
consequences that emerge from his study. 
Terrorism in an Unstable World is a much longer volume, weighing in at 235 pages, divided into six 
parts and 20 chapters, plus a breakdown of bibliographic sources by chapter and a rather detailed index. The 
book is a pleasure to read, primarily because of the extensive cross-referencing, which helps the reader 
connect the many different strands explored throughout the volume. As will be discussed below, there is a 
consistent and unifying message that connects the disparate parts and the organization of the book allows the 
reader to grasp this quite readily. Clutterbuck surveys a vast amount of information. By far the largest pail 
(Part II) looks at a wide range of technological issues pertaining to computers, weaponry, tactics and 
physical security. Part III focuses on the issue of drugs, Part IV on rural guerrilla warfare. Part V on urban 
terrorism, including airport and airline security, and Part VI on his overall conclusions.   Part I. the 
introduction, presents the overall themes of the book, including a quick survey of the world's hot spots and 
the nature of conflict in the post-communist world. 
Hewitt is careful to draw distinctions between types of political violence and to describe how 
"political violence varies between types of societies" and how its impact also varies according to type of 
society, (p. 2) For example, he demonstrates quite convincingly the different impacts of revolutionary and 
nationalist terrorism, concluding that the former "'has failed to generate a revolutionary situation in any of 
the countries that we examined," (p. 116) while "the long-lasting nature of [nationalist] conflicts . . . 
distinguishes them from revolutionary insurgencies." (p. 119-20) His overall conclusion is that "Western 
societies and their democratic institutions are resilient, and usually able to tolerate a considerable amount of 
political violence without serious consequences." (p. 127) 
By contrast, Clutterbuck is much more prone, as we shall see below, to lump widely disparate 
phenomena into the same basket — "people killing each other." (pp. xii, 207) The overall tone of his 
argument is alarmist: "despite the end of the Cold War, tens of thousands of people die every year from 
various kinds of terrorism." (p. 3) Because he includes ethnic cleansing, drug trafficking and international 
crime, along with rural guerrilla and urban terrorism, his conclusions and proposals are equally wide-ranging. 
They include the use of NATO as an executive arm of the UN. (p. 211) modifications of legal procedure, 
such as a re interpretation of the right to silence, (p. 213) stricter control of the possession and movement of 
arms, ammunition and explosives, (p. 215) including tagging all explosives (a controversial measure in the 
US because of opposition by the National Rifle Association, among others), perpetual imprisonment of drug 
traffickers and compulsory treatment of drug addicts, (p. 217) and more research on detection of explosives, 
identification that includes the prevention of impersonation, and aids to intelligence, (p. 218) The overall 
emphasis of these proposals is on the use of science and technology, although the importance of the human 
element emerged clearly from some of the examples, particularly in the detection of explosives and the 
screening of airline carry-on baggage.-1
Hewitt is probably the first to examine the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies over time.4 In 
The Consequences of Political Violence, he fills another significant gap in the literature by focusing on the 
impact of political violence on economic, social and political life, as well as the institutional and policy 
changes that occur in response to such violence. He is one of the few to attempt to measure, both in the 
short-term and the long-term, the effects of terrorism and political violence or the effects of counter-
measures taken against them. Because he is interested in a wide range of effects and their interaction (for 
example, the impact of economic and social changes on public opinion), Hewitt limits himself to countries 
where public opinion surveys and accurate statistics were available. Because of these data requirements, his 
study is confined to the five countries mentioned above. For two cases, Northern Ireland and Spain, his data 
stops in 1986 simply because "it proved difficult to get many statistics after this date." (p. 5) Clearly, one 
of the chief limitations of his study, as with any quantitative study, lies in the incompleteness of his data. A 
separate appendix describes in greater detail the data used, in particular that pertaining to political violence 
and security force counter-measures, economic conditions. and public opinion polls, (pp. 130-35) 
The limitations of quantitative measures are further highlighted by some of Hewitt's findings. For 
example, he measures cinema attendance and mass transit use in his five countries during the selected 
periods of intense violence and compares trends projected from the pre-violence period with actual results. 
(p. 35) In some cases, comparisons could not be made because statistics were lacking: e.g., cinema 
attendance for Northern Ireland and mass transit for Italy. In other cases, the results were difficult to 
explain: "the impact is curiously uneven, and does not seem strongly correlated with the degree of risk." (p. 
36) While railway stations and cinemas were attacked in both Italy and Spain, railway travel declines only in 
Spain and cinema attendance only in Italy. As for the reliability of results, while Hewitt finds no decline in 
railway use in Northern Ireland, where the risk of victimization is greatest, he cites Northern Ireland rail 
officials as claiming that disruptions caused significant passenger loss. (p. 43, n. 8) To his credit. Hewitt 
does not strain to explain all his figures: occasionally, he points out why his figures might appear 
contradictory and suggests a resolution, such as the fact that railway use declined significantly in Uruguay 
despite the absence of attacks on trains, (significant decline in tourism) At other times, he simply admits the 
limitations of his findings. What is more, he provides rich descriptive data of a more qualitative nature, 
usually derived from such sources as Time and Newsweek or country studies. These serve to complement 
the quantitative data and to compensate for some of its inherent weaknesses and incompleteness. 
On the other hand, some of Hewitt's measures seem forced. When he tries to measure political 
behavior, he resorts to counting "political acts." which he divides into executive actions, legislation, 
meetings and statements, (p. 72) In doing so, he misses the context within which these acts occur and, more 
crucially, their content. This renders some of his data unconvincing, such as the supposedly greater concern 
expressed over rightist violence as opposed to leftist violence. (Table 5.3, p. 77) As for his measure of 
conflict/consensus, it is not obvious that agreement can be measured by the fact that politicians "meet with 
one another." (p. 79) Meetings can be hostile and can generate criticism of one another, as Hewitt himself 
demonstrates in the case of Northern Ireland, where "many meetings between Ulster politicians involved the 
two hostile groups in conference with a third party — usually the British government." (p. 92) While Hewitt 
acknowledges the crudeness of his measure (p. 79) it is clear that one can only go so far with the results. 
One of Hewitt's most interesting findings concerns what he calls "cumulative effects" (p. 4) or 
"threshold effects." (p. 41) In describing the social consequences of violence in his five countries, Hewitt 
finds that the level of violence determines the extent of the social impact. Low levels of violence affect only 
the social activities of the elite. Higher levels affect the general public to a greater extent as normal policing 
becomes impossible and utilities and public services are disrupted. Finally, severe levels of violence lead to 
a breakdown of the social order, the deterioration of government authority and population movements. (see 
Table 3.4. p. 40) While Hewitt confines himself to five countries, it is possible to extrapolate such findings 
to societies where the level of violence approaches civil war, such as Sri Lanka, Turkey or Lebanon, or where 
communal violence threatens to undermine regional government, such as India. 
When data permit, some of the results are compelling, such as the close parallel between the monthly 
death rate in Spain due to terrorism and the level of public concern about terrorism (p. 53, Fig. 4.1) or the 
temporary effect of terrorist violence on public opinion, (pp. 65-66) In nationalist conflicts, such as the 
Basques and Northern Irish Catholics, one impact of repressive policies is to generate a polarization in public 
attitudes toward security along ethnic or religious lines, (pp. 59-60. Table 4.4) Protestant support for various 
policies far exceeds Catholic support; Spanish support exceeds Basque support. Yet it is also interesting to 
see that 55 percent of Catholics support tougher measures, including 20 percent who support the death 
penalty for terrorist murders (vs. 95 percent and 69 percent for Protestants). It is also frightening to see 61 
percent of Protestants supporting a shoot to kill policy and 86 percent approving plastic bullets (vs. 7 
percent and 13 percent for Catholics). It is clear that in the case of ethnic conflict, repressive policies, 
particularly because they impact selectively upon the ethnic community from which terrorist recruits and 
supporters are drawn, can serve to exacerbate or perpetuate the problem by polarizing public opinion and 
increasing or maintaining support for the terrorists. This is why Hewitt, as have others,5 stresses the 
importance of propaganda in the fight against terrorism (p. 126) particularly in the form of vigorous public 
relations campaigns. Clutterbuck also alludes to this when he suggests that, in combating rural guerrilla 
warfare, governments would do well to take advantage of developing communications technology (such as 
the spread of television into remote villages) to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the public, (p. 148) 
It is significant that the word "crime" does not appear in the index for Terrorism in an Unstable 
World, given that the word is paired with the word "terrorism" on almost every page, as are the words 
"criminal" and "terrorist." In fact, Clutterbuck's book does not confine itself to terrorism at all, as is made 
clear in his preface. In the last sentence (p. xii) he identifies those from whom science and technology (a 
major focus of the book) must protect us: terrorists, religious fanatics, drug traffickers, criminals and "ethnic 
cleansers." the latter being identified as an "old terrorist technique" in new form. (p. 163) Clutterbuck deals 
with them all, whether discussing weaponry, tactics, groups or prevention. For example, in discussing 
kidnapping (chapter 16 on Urban Terrorist Techniques, pp. 172-76), he spends almost half his time on 
criminal gangs (as opposed to urban terrorists). On p. 175, he states: "Both criminal and political 
kidnapping have proved effective enough in achieving their aims to make it likely that this form of crime 
will continue." (emphasis added) Here, we see how Clutterbuck subsumes both forms of kidnapping under 
the same rubric, "crime," even though he previously shows how different they really are. (p. 174) By contrast, 
Hewitt found that in Italy, only 8 percent of kidnap victims were abducted by terrorist groups, while only 0.1 
percent of robberies in Spain, Italy and Uruguay and 0.04 percent of robberies in Germany were committed 
by terrorists. As such, he clearly distinguishes between terrorist crime and ordinary crime, pointing out that 
only in Northern Ireland did terrorist crime constitute a significant proportion of total crime, (p. 12) 
This lumping together of different forms of violence in Terrorism in an Unstable World is not, I 
believe, the result of sloppiness or carelessness on the part of its author; it is too systematic. Nor is it the 
result of definitional fuzziness. On page 5, Clutterbuck demonstrates clearly that he is not prone to the kinds 
of definitional ambiguities that have plagued the literature.6
Terrorism is a technique . . . used by all sides: by guerrillas, by freedom fighters, by dissidents, 
by political activists of the left or right, by nationalists, by ethnic and religious groups, by Mafia-
style criminal gangs, by drug-trafficking organizations, and - perhaps most of all - by 
authoritarian governments (whether they style themselves left or right), and by their 'death 
squads' to which they turn a blind eye or which they discreetly sponsor (emphasis in original). 
Defining terrorism as "a lethal kind of intimidation," (p. 5) Clutterbuck does not fall into the common 
trap of basing his definitions on ends rather than means. His list of perpetrators covers the entire political and 
ideological spectrum, including state as well as non-state actors (with proper emphasis on the predominance 
of state terrorism), left and right, and criminal, religious and ethnic groups. From this, the reader might 
expect the book to deal with all these phenomena in equal measure. Yet in the very next chapter, in a 
paragraph that introduces the issue of security and intelligence, he commits a startling non sequitur that 
belies this assumption. 
It is very easy to place bombs to kill the citizens of a free society going about their business, 
provided that the perpetrators have no conscience about killing indiscriminately, like those who 
placed a bomb under the New York Trade Center in February 1993, or bombed a busy shopping 
centre in England in March 1993. In an increasingly tolerant society it is easy for young 
criminals to steal, rob and rape. (emphasis added) 
From the World Trade Center bombers and the IRA, he suddenly shifts to theft, robbery and rape by 
delinquents. That he includes such apples and oranges in the same basket is confirmed in the following 
sentence, when he states that "the law enforcement agencies can provide only a very slender barrier against 
these people." (emphasis added) He then goes on to suggest that "only two things can reinforce this barrier: a 
real fear among the criminals and terrorists of being caught, and of the consequences if they are; and active 
co-operation and vigilance by citizens prepared to face the risks of giving information and evidence to 
convict." (emphasis added) 
In fact, as a former soldier and counterinsurgency expert (despite his claims to being a layman in the 
preface, cf. p. xii) Clutterbuck's model for combating terrorism and crime is a counterinsurgency one and his 
concept of the rule of law is reinforcing police and military intelligence and providing incentives for informers 
and repentiti. Nothing is ever said about protecting due process, only about how to relax it in emergency 
situations. Clutterbuck deals with the complex issue of balancing security needs with civil liberties and the 
rule of law in one brief concluding chapter, just over eight pages in length in a volume that exceeds two 
hundred pages. The bulk of this short chapter actually deals with measures that, should they be implemented, 
would infringe upon the freedom of individuals and institutions, such as freezing assets of suspected 
protection racketeers and their families (p. 214), or banning banks from transactions with any foreign banks 
not providing full right of access to records, (p. 218) And in the area of profiling, identification and 
preventing impersonation, Clutterbuck is categorical: any objection to compulsory, machine-readable ID 
cards "can no longer be sustained," (p. 220) given the extent of the threat. Yet. as he argues throughout the 
book, this threat goes far beyond the traditional realms of terrorism and political violence, to include the 
world of drug trafficking and international crime: "In the face of growing violence, drug trafficking and 
other crime, we can really no longer afford the emotional prejudice against citizens having to be 
identifiable." (p. 81) For Clutterbuck, it is simply an "emotional prejudice," an irrational stance 
unsubstantiated by reason or logic. It is really only in the last two pages of the volume that he makes any 
concrete proposal for the vague references to safeguards for civil liberties and these, too, end up to be 
technological, relying on computer recording of any officer's ID checks — presumably to avoid abuse. 
In a chapter entitled "A Vulnerable Society," Clutterbuck identifies as "the interlocking themes running 
through this book," "the malign influences of drugs, violence and lust for money and power." (p. 21) While 
he focuses on a wide range of topics, it is his treatment of the issue of drugs that underscores both the 
strengths and weaknesses of this volume. By looking at issues such as drugs, money laundering and other 
crimes alongside the more traditional phenomena of political violence, Clutterbuck highlights the importance 
of criminal terrorism in the spectrum of violent intimidation. Yet, in doing so, he sidesteps the importance of 
political and economic solutions that look to the long-term and chooses to accentuate the technological 
solutions that may help in the short-term, but tend to create both political and economic problems in the 
longer term. 
In the opening paragraph of Part III, entitled "Drugs, Political Violence and Crime," we are told that 
"the cultivation, processing, transport and distribution of narcotics is probably the greatest single generator 
of political violence and crime in the world .... In certain countries it is now a far more potent motivator of 
terrorism than Marxist ideology or religious fundamentalism." (p. 87) Here we see the collapsing of 
political violence and crime and the replacement of the old ideological threats with the new material/criminal 
ones. Yet the lust for money and power that Clutterbuck sees is uniquely that of the crime lords and the drug 
kingpins. The book is strangely silent, for example, about the arms trade, which involves many governments, 
including Western democratic ones.7 Nor does Clutterbuck mention the role of Western companies and 
corporations in the export of technology conducive to human rights violations such as torture. These, too, 
are symptoms of the lust for money and power, and they, too, generate political violence and crimes against 
humanity. Yet they do not fall within the purview of this apparently wide-ranging survey. 
When he turns to solutions to the problems he identifies, Clutterbuck's arguments are well made, 
persuasively presented, and comprehensive, in that he does present counter-arguments and he does provide 
concrete suggestions for implementing his proposed solutions. Yet his arguments are based far more on 
unsubstantiated supposition than at first meets the eye, and some of his assertions hold only within the limited 
framework of his original premises. Too often, he fails to explore the counter-arguments that he raises and 
reverts to his narrow frame of reference. For example, his assumption that addicts have but two choices — 
crime or recruitment of further addicts (pp. 103, 106) — is maintained despite his own counter-argument (pp. 
103-4) that legalization, licencing and taxation may be the best courses, "if all else fails." (p. 104) Clearly, 
crime and recruitment are direct offshoots of criminalization. Enforced treatment of addicts will not work. 
Nor will "life-means-life" sentences for pushers. If "prison spreads addiction rather than suppressing it," as 
Clutterbuck contends (p. 103), the implication is that pushers simply continue to ply their trade within the 
prison system. 
Clutterbuck's call for "life-means-life" for "drug traffickers, couriers and pushers," (pp. 105, 217) is 
totally unrealistic and the author even recognizes this when he admits that prison officials would oppose 
such a policy, (p. 105) From a purely economic point of view, it is not feasible, given the government 
cutbacks that are sweeping the Western world. From a practical point of view, it makes more sense to 
legalize and control the production and distribution of drugs than to use the criminal justice system, the 
police and the prisons. As for the addicts, while Clutterbuck calls for compulsory treatment, he also states 
that "the majority revert to the addiction under stress." (p. 104) If this is so, surely the answer lies in long-
term, wide-ranging social policy to address the sources of stress in these people's lives. Finally, his assertion 
that "hard drugs are much more damaging and addictive than alcohol" (p. 104) is just that: an assertion. 
Given the central role that alcohol plays in domestic violence and traffic accidents — two of the greatest 
scourges of Western society — he is probably even wrong. 
As for the link with terrorism and insurgency, this is based on the assertion that the drug trade finances 
campaigns around the world: Columbia, Peru, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, to name a few. 
Yet Lebanon, for one, was maintained by much more than drugs, while Myanmar has one of the worst human 
rights records in the world. To characterize the latter’s problems as caused by the drug trade is facile at best 
and tendentious at least. Clutterbuck seems to imply that these conflicts would disappear without the drug 
trade, but he completely ignores the central role of the arms trade and foreign aid by competing states and 
sponsors, both "East" and "West," in these conflicts. 
Terrorism in an Unstable World is an informative and entertaining book, as anyone who has read any 
of Richard Clutterbuck's previous books will already know. There are some nuggets in this book, such as the 
succinct contrast between the French and British schools of counterinsurgency. (pp. 116-17) When applied to 
Peru, this distinction provides valuable insights into the general problem of how best to deal with insurgent 
violence in a variety of political systems. It is when he strays away from areas of expertise for which he is 
justly respected and begins to apply lessons learned there to the criminal area that Clutterbuck fails to 
persuade and. in fact, begins to alarm with his rhetorical flourishes. 
In two cases of revolutionary terrorism studied by Christopher Hewitt, Italy and Germany, terrorism 
clearly generated increased support for repressive measures, (p. 64) substantiating a widely held view that the 
public usually prefers the inconvenience of repressive measures to the insecurity of terrorism and will 
generally accept some restriction of civil liberties and freedoms in the name of security. Clutterbuck clearly 
bases his proposals for countering the post-Soviet threat on this assumption: "only the guilty have anything 
to fear." (p. 220) Yet the Uruguayan case presented by Hewitt reveals another dimension to this generally 
accepted truism: public perceptions of the terrorists remained fairly positive even "when terrorist killings were 
at their highest." (Hewitt, p. 66) Hewitt suggests that this was a result of government counter-measures 
which, unlike in Italy and Germany, were widespread and extreme, including mass searches and routine use 
of torture, and affected a wide segment of the population. This highlights the fact that repressive responses 
that undermine the rule of law can benefit the terrorist and maintain public support despite the level of 
violence. It is a cautionary tale for those like Clutterbuck who seem to feel that tough legislation that limits 
traditional freedoms are warranted in today's "unstable world." Many Latin American governments that are 
infamous for gross human rights violations, e.g., Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil, typically inflated the 
threat of terrorism, generalizing it to wider segments of the population and justifying routine use of torture 
or disappearances by arguing that a war was being waged against the state and even — in Argentina — 
Western civilization.8
Reading Clutterbuck's Terrorism in an Unstable World, one sometimes gets the uneasy feeling that a 
similar discourse is being developed, particularly as it relates to drug trafficking and international crime. By 
contrast, in Consequences of Political Violence, Hewitt takes a much more moderate approach, reminding 
the reader that "the most severe disruptions are produced not by political violence itself but by the 
governments' response to it." (p. 123) While Clutterbuck argues that special legislation should be held in 
reserve (chapter 20), Hewitt insists that '"such policies should be used as little as possible." (p. 123) 
Elsewhere. I have argued that the most common route that governments responding to terrorism have taken 
toward an anti-democratic control model has been via the deformation of due process in the form of special 
laws and procedures.9 While Hewitt, in his earlier study,10 has shown that repressive policies do not work and 
can be counterproductive (see also the study under review here), others have shown that emergency 
legislation, such as the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act, have in practice become permanent and tend to 
permanently alter the constitutional order.'' As such, studies such as Hewitt's that attempt, despite 
methodological limitations, to measure over time the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on political, 
economic and social life are invaluable to policy makers despite their limited generalizability. More wide-
ranging surveys such as Clutterbuck's serve to highlight those areas where new developments may occur 
and new challenges to striking the proper balance between civil liberties and security needs may arise. While 
Clutterbuck, along with others.12 assimilate the threat of terrorism with that of crime, particularly organized 
crime, recent events such as the Oklahoma City bombing or the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Japan show 
that the threat of terrorism from the right or from fanatical cults is at least as important in the wake of the 
Cold War as the more popular shibboleths of Islamic fundamentalism, drug cartels and international crime 
syndicates. 
Ronald D. Crelinsten  
University of Ottawa 
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